Print this page

Sudan’s war: foreign military support, drone strikes and civilian harm

A gathering of people in traditional Sudanese attire A gathering of people in traditional Sudanese attire © Yusuf Yassir on Unsplash

Sudan’s war: UN Report exposes how foreign military support, drone warfare and systematic attacks on civilians fuel a deepening humanitarian crisis.

Contextual framework of the Sudanese conflict

The internal armed conflict in Sudan, which erupted on April 15, 2023, started in Khartoum and rapidly escalated nationwide into a multi-front civil war. What began as an unresolved power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, rapidly shifted into a deeply fragmented and multi-theater conflict. Initial hostilities, centered on the capital, underwent significant structural consolidation between 2024 and 2026, creating a territorial division across the country, where the SAF dominates the Central Nile Corridor and Eastern Zone, and the RSF dominates the Western Darfur Region. From April 2023 to mid-2024, the war was carried out with conventional weapons and expanded in late 2025 to include drone warfare with long-range precision strikes.

Key findings of the UN report

The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, in its informal report submitted to the Human Rights Council's Sixty-Third Session (A/HRC/63/23), provides findings on how external support networks and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have reshaped the war, causing major civilian harm and international crimes.

The UN mission establishes reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network supplies the RSF with advanced weaponry, logistics, technical training and foreign combatants.

Entities and individuals registered in or operating from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) play a central role in financing, contracting and facilitating weapons and contractor transfers to the RSF. The main logistical corridors and regional transit hubs are:

  • Puntland functions as an air and maritime transit hub for flights transporting weapons and personnel from United Arab Emirates (UAE) facilities.
  • Bases in southeastern Libya serve as supply depots for fuel, vehicles and arms, as well as specialized military training grounds.
  • Chad serves as a primary logistical land corridor for cross-border supply convoys entering RSF-controlled Darfur.

Furthermore, up to 2,000 former Colombian military personnel were recruited and deployed into RSF operations, and they received specialized training at facilities including the Ghayathi base in the UAE before deployment.

The UN mission also established that foreign military support has been provided to the SAF. Preliminary findings of the mission confirm that the SAF expanded its long-range precision strike capabilities through foreign-supplied UAVs.

The mission concluded that both parties committed serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and customary law, with repeated attacks on non-military targets, and highlighted that external state patrons and private corporations providing material assistance or equipment, while aware of ongoing systematic abuses, meet the threshold for aiding and abetting international crimes under international law.

Impact on civilians

Over 33.7 million people in Sudan require urgent humanitarian assistance, more than 14 million people have been forcibly displaced, and as of July 2026, 4.6 million are refugees across neighboring states. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identified 15,168 civilian fatalities and more than 4,500 direct civilian targeting events between January 2024 and mid-2026. The RSF was identified as responsible for 70% of direct civilian targeting events, while SAF unguided aerial bombardments accounted for 27% of civilian fatalities. Drone strikes became the primary driver of civilian mortality in early 2026, accounting for up to 80% of civilian deaths. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented that more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes between January and May 2026 alone.

Weaponized starvation and engineered famine, systematic infrastructure erosion and destruction of healthcare infrastructure, and attacks on aid workers were the primary tactics used to wage the war.

Satellite images analyzed by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab confirmed that RSF forces systematically razed 41 rural agrarian communities, clearing livestock corrals to destroy the local food supply chain. In May, over 19.5 million people faced acute food insecurity, with catastrophic malnutrition rates among children in Darfur and Kordofan.

Targeted drone and artillery strikes against utility networks degraded essential lifelines. Repeated strikes between May and July 2026 destroyed central electrical substations and eight commercial fuel stations, disabling water pumps in El Obeid.

Over 70% of healthcare facilities in conflict zones are non-functional or have been destroyed due to continuous airstrikes. In March 2026, SAF drone strikes directly hit the emergency room and blood bank of the Ad-Da’ein Teaching Hospital, killing at least 70 civilians and injuring 146. In mid-2024, the RSF blocked El Fasher and proceeded to bomb several hospitals. Additionally, over 84 humanitarian workers have been killed or detained since 2025.

Legal framework

Under international law, all belligerents are legally bound by IHL, specifically Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, as well as International Human Rights Law and customary international law.

The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan concluded that systematically directing aerial and drone bombardments against non-military targets violates the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality, constituting war crimes. Furthermore, weaponizing hunger and imposing sieges constitute the war crime of starvation.

Transnational military transfers directly violate the UN Security Council's Darfur arms embargo under Resolutions 1556 and 1591. Furthermore, private military companies and corporate intermediaries that facilitate the transfer of weapons, logistical support and foreign fighters incur legal liability for aiding and abetting international crimes.

Recommendations

The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan outlines six explicit recommendations in Section VI of Report A/HRC/63/23. These include:

  • Protection of civilians in drone operations: warring parties must end hostilities and take precautions around civilian hospitals, schools and displacement sites.
  • Preserve strike evidence: monitoring bodies and belligerents must retain targeting logs, strike coordinates, aerial imagery and munition data to support independent judicial investigations.
  • Halt foreign military support and extend the embargo: states must strictly enforce the Darfur arms embargo and suspend transfers of drones and weapons; the UN Security Council should expand the arms embargo nationwide across all of Sudan.
  • Provide adequate funding to tracking entities.
  • Ensure direct medical care for victims.
  • Prosecute all actors who commit or facilitate international crimes: states should support and expand the International Criminal Court's (ICC) jurisdiction beyond Darfur and establish a specialized court for Sudan working alongside the ICC.

 

By Massimo Cecchini

Read 111 times